One hundred years ago, the eminent German physician, Emil Kraepelin, published the eighth edition of his very successful textbook on psychiatry. It wasn't terribly different from the preceding version, but one small change would prove to have enduring consequences. Several neurologists and psychiatrists had described a disorder that looked very much like the dementia associated with old age but which afflicted people as young as 50. Kraepelin gave the disease a name. He called it "Alzheimer's disease," based on a case report that the neuropathologist Alois Alzheimer had presented in 1906. The name stuck although "Alzheimer's disease," was ultimately found to be indistinguishable from age-related dementia. What have we learned about the disease in the ensuing 100 years? The Alzheimer's Society's new report, Alzheimer's Facts and Figures 2010 gives us a snapshot of the disease as we know it today.
For 100 years there has been debate about the cause of dementia. Is it caused by plaques and tangles, the abnormal material that Alois Alzheimer observed under the microscope when he examined the brain of his patient, Frau Auguste D, after her death? Or is it a vascular condition, due to hardening of the arteries? For the last several decades, physicians have been confident that there are several distinct forms of dementia, with Alzheimer's disease and vascular or multi-infarct dementia discrete entities. But now the lines are blurring: a new autopsy study suggests that many cases of dementia are due to a mixture of several problems. By examining the brains of older individuals who had clinical evidence of Alzheimer's disease during life, scientists found that less than half of them had Alzheimer's disease alone. Fully one-third had infarcts (strokes) as well as Alzheimer's changes in their brains. About 15% had changes of Parkinson's disease in addition to Alzheimer's. These findings are not merely of academic interest: if it takes several distinct processes occurring simultaneously to produce dementia, there are potential therapeutic implications. Perhaps it will sufficient to intervene in just one of the processes-or maybe it will be necessary to strike all the contributors to the disease at once.
When Alzheimer described his patient, Frau Auguste D, a woman who first presented at age 51 with memory loss, paranoia, and the inability to care for herself, dementia was relatively rare. Most cases of dementia, after all, arise in people over age 65 and life expectancy in Germany in the early 20th century was only 60 years. The latest prevalence data show that today 5.3 million Americans have Alzheimer's disease or some other form of dementia, 5.1 million of whom are 65 years of age or older. The disease disproportionately affects women-which is partly but not entirely due to the fact that women live longer than men. A total of 10% of men and 16% of women over age 70 have dementia.
What Kraepelin and Alzheimer did not fully appreciate but what we know now is that dementia is a terminal illness: it is the 5th leading cause of death in people over age 65. But most people with dementia also have other chronic diseases, which makes sorting out what actually causes death is tricky: fully 60% of Medicare patients with dementia have high blood pressure, 26% have coronary artery disease, 23% have diabetes, and 25% show the residual effects of strokes.
Caring for individuals with dementia was sometimes a challenge even in Alzheimer's day-Frau D. had to be institutionalized because her behavior was so difficult to manage. The situation today is orders of magnitude more problematic. The number of people with dementia is growing dramatically, but the numbers of trained geriatric professionals (physicians, nurses, social workers) is not. Right now there are a paltry 7128 physicians who are board certified in geriatrics, with the projected need by 2030 estimated at 36,000 and no evidence that more doctors are going into the field. Even more worrisome is the lack of personal caregivers. Currently most of the direct care for people with dementia is provided by family and friends: 11 million unpaid caregivers provide a stunning 12.5 billion hours of care annually, or about 22 hours/week. As the population with dementia increases, it is far from clear how we will provide adequate professional and non-professional care.
In 1910, medical technology was essentially nonexistent. In 2010, it is widespread, especially in older people and even more so in older people with dementia. Medicare beneficiaries with dementia are 3 times more likely than their non-demented counterparts to be hospitalized. Looked at differently, at any point in time about one-fourth of all hospitalized patients over age 65 have dementia. Reflecting this trend, Medicare spends $15,145/year for each person with dementia compared to $5272/year for each person without dementia-and these figures do not include long term nursing home care, which is not covered by Medicare. What these numbers mean is that people with dementia receive is the same high tech, life-prolonging treatment that non-demented patients receive-multiplied by three both because they tend to have other chronic diseases and because they cannot articulate what exactly is bothering them, resulting int their being subjected to even more tests than other people. At first glance this might seem like a good thing, indicating that patients with dementia are not discriminated against. But instituting aggressive, life-prolonging therapy in people who have a terminal disease is of questionable benefit, particularly when it both causes suffering (people with dementia do not understand why they are receiving painful or frightening procedures) and is hugely expensive.
Kraepelin and Alzheimer lived in an ethnically and racially homogeneous society. Contemporary America is ethnically diverse and racial disparities in medical care are widespread. What is particularly striking is new evidence that older African Americans have twice the risk of developing dementia as do their white counterparts. The Washington Heights-Inwood Columbia Aging Program found that among people 85 years of age or older, the prevalence of dementia is 30.2% in whites, 58.6% in blacks, and 62.9% in Hispanics. The high rate of hypertension, diabetes, stroke, and coronary disease in African Americans and Hispanics may be responsible for the disparities. There is some hope that prevention of these conditions will ultimately be found to prevent dementia, although a recent NIH state-of-the-science conference concluded that "there is currently no evidence considered to be of even moderate scientific quality supporting the association of any modifiable factor...with reduced risk of Alzheimer's disease."
The centennial of Kraepelin's momentous naming decision is passing almost unnoticed. It should stimulate renewed dedication to addressing the challenges of caring for the growing numbers of patients and families devastated by Alzheimer's disease.
July 01, 2010
May 26, 2010
Say It Isn't So
My very first post on "Perspectives on Aging" dealt with dementia. I reported on a study that found exercise could decrease the risk of becoming demented. Since then I've blogged about dementia in general and Alzheimer's disease in particular 5 more times without a whole lot of encouraging news. The bad news just got a little worse: a recent National Institutes of Health "state-of-the-science" conference concluded that although a few tantalizing studies have suggested that exercise or social engagement or crossword puzzles could fend off dementia, a systematic evaluation fails to confirm these findings.
Dementia is unfortunately a very common condition which more and more people are developing as the population ages. At last count, 5.4 million Americans had Alzheimer's disease. Medications to treat Alzheimer's are mediocre-the most positive statement the American Psychiatric Association could make in a recent practice guideline for the most effective drugs, the cholinesterase inhibitors, is that they have a "modest" effect in a "substantial minority" of patients. Hardly a ringing endorsement. The antipsychotics, drugs often prescribed to treat the behavioral manifestations of dementia, have been associated with a small increased risk of death-which might be an acceptable price to pay if they worked, but they rarely do. Despite the scientific progress in the understanding of how Alzheimer's disease develops-and we know infinitely more today than Alois Alzheimer did in 1906 when he peered through the microscope and found plaques and tangles outside and inside (respectively) the neurons of his former patient, Auguste D-the prognosis for effective intervention is poor.
The new NIH report is very blunt: "There is currently no evidence considered to be of even moderate scientific quality supporting the association of any modifiable factor...with reduced risk of Alzheimer's disease." By "modifiable factor," the report means nutritional supplements, dietary factors, medications, social factors, economic factors, medical conditions, toxins, and other environmental exposures.
But perhaps we are looking at the problem the wrong way. In geriatrics, it's actually quite rare to find a single intervention that can prevent a complex condition, what geriatricians call a syndrome. A growing literature advocates a multi-pronged attack on this sort of problem. The risk of falling, for example, can be lowered somewhere between 25 and 39% of a combination of maneuvers, including review of medications and gait and balance training. The risk of developing delirium (an acute confusional state) in the hospital can be lowered by a third with a combination of 6 interventions, including avoidance of sleeping pills and providing patients with their glasses and hearing aids.
Maybe, just maybe, the risk of dementia can be lowered by maintaining contacts with other people, participating in social activities, playing music, exercising, and taking medication to treat high blood pressure. Each alone may have an extremely modest effect, but together, they just might make a difference.
Dementia is unfortunately a very common condition which more and more people are developing as the population ages. At last count, 5.4 million Americans had Alzheimer's disease. Medications to treat Alzheimer's are mediocre-the most positive statement the American Psychiatric Association could make in a recent practice guideline for the most effective drugs, the cholinesterase inhibitors, is that they have a "modest" effect in a "substantial minority" of patients. Hardly a ringing endorsement. The antipsychotics, drugs often prescribed to treat the behavioral manifestations of dementia, have been associated with a small increased risk of death-which might be an acceptable price to pay if they worked, but they rarely do. Despite the scientific progress in the understanding of how Alzheimer's disease develops-and we know infinitely more today than Alois Alzheimer did in 1906 when he peered through the microscope and found plaques and tangles outside and inside (respectively) the neurons of his former patient, Auguste D-the prognosis for effective intervention is poor.
The new NIH report is very blunt: "There is currently no evidence considered to be of even moderate scientific quality supporting the association of any modifiable factor...with reduced risk of Alzheimer's disease." By "modifiable factor," the report means nutritional supplements, dietary factors, medications, social factors, economic factors, medical conditions, toxins, and other environmental exposures.
But perhaps we are looking at the problem the wrong way. In geriatrics, it's actually quite rare to find a single intervention that can prevent a complex condition, what geriatricians call a syndrome. A growing literature advocates a multi-pronged attack on this sort of problem. The risk of falling, for example, can be lowered somewhere between 25 and 39% of a combination of maneuvers, including review of medications and gait and balance training. The risk of developing delirium (an acute confusional state) in the hospital can be lowered by a third with a combination of 6 interventions, including avoidance of sleeping pills and providing patients with their glasses and hearing aids.
Maybe, just maybe, the risk of dementia can be lowered by maintaining contacts with other people, participating in social activities, playing music, exercising, and taking medication to treat high blood pressure. Each alone may have an extremely modest effect, but together, they just might make a difference.
April 13, 2010
It’s the Law
After all the rancor and the political posturing and the delays, we finally have major health reform legislation. The new law will result in 30 million currently uninsured Americans buying health insurance and it will abolish some of the most egregious practices of the insurance industry, such as use of pre-existing conditions to refuse coverage. But what effect will it have on controlling the cost of medical care?
The rate of rise of health care costs is a problem, as Peter Orszag (formerly of the CBO and now director of the Office of Management and Budget); Rand Corporation researchers; and the conservative think tank, the Heritage Foundation, all agree because it is a major threat to the American economy. The long-term projections of the CBO, published last July, are that total U.S. spending on health care, which was 16% of GDP in 2007, will rise to 25% of GDP in 2025 and 37% of GDP in 2050. The new law has the potential to result in a significant decline in the percent of GDP we spend on health care each year. But whether it achieves this end depends on how several key provisions of the bill are actually implemented.
The provisions of the health reform legislation that could have a profound effect on the rate of growth of spending on medical care have to do with payment reform. And the potentially most potent payment reform strategy that appears in the bill is “bundling.” The legislation calls for the establishment of a national Medicare pilot program to “test, develop, and evaluate” bundled payment for acute inpatient hospital care, physician services, outpatient services, and post acute care for a single episode of care. According to estimates by researchers at Rand, a system of bundled payments, could potentially decrease national health spending by as much as 5.4% in the next 10 years (if applied to both Medicare and the private sector). The same researchers propose a 6.2% target for reducing spending on health care over the next 10 years; hence bundling alone could make an enormous difference.
The new law also provides incentives to health care systems to form “accountable care organizations” (essentially networks of providers that agree to capitation, another form of bundling) by offering them a share in the savings they generate for Medicare if they meet quality targets. It remains to be seen how widespread accountable care organizations will become. Health care reform also provides for an “Innovation Center” within CMS to evaluate, test, and expand different payment structures. Whether this provision will lead to savings depends on what payment structures are tested, how effective they are, and whether they are then disseminated. A final provision in the domain of payment reform is the establishment of an Independent Payment Advisory Board, charged with submitting legislative proposals to reduce the per capita rate of growth in Medicare spending whenever spending exceeds a target growth rate. However, the Board is prohibited from submitting proposals that will “ration care,” a provision, like the notorious “reasonable and necessary” language of the original Medicare statute, which will no doubt serve as the basis for rejecting any plan that restricts potentially useful treatment on the basis of cost.
Beyond payment reform, the new law will establish a Patient Centered Outcomes Research Institute to conduct research comparing the clinical effectiveness of alternative treatments. In principle, this kind of information could change medical practice to avoid the use of unnecessary or unnecessarily expensive treatments. But the bill has a built-in guarantee that the information will not be used in this way. It states that the findings of the Institute “may not be construed as mandates, guidelines, or recommendation for payment, coverage … or used to deny coverage.”
A powerful new law is on the books. With it, the U.S. finally joins all the other countries in the developed world in assuring a basic level of health care for its citizens. But will it constrain the rate of growth of spending on medical care? Only if we can depoliticize the boards, centers, and institutes that are the key to change.
A modified version of this article was posted on the Health Care Cost Monitor on March 19, 2010.
The rate of rise of health care costs is a problem, as Peter Orszag (formerly of the CBO and now director of the Office of Management and Budget); Rand Corporation researchers; and the conservative think tank, the Heritage Foundation, all agree because it is a major threat to the American economy. The long-term projections of the CBO, published last July, are that total U.S. spending on health care, which was 16% of GDP in 2007, will rise to 25% of GDP in 2025 and 37% of GDP in 2050. The new law has the potential to result in a significant decline in the percent of GDP we spend on health care each year. But whether it achieves this end depends on how several key provisions of the bill are actually implemented.
The provisions of the health reform legislation that could have a profound effect on the rate of growth of spending on medical care have to do with payment reform. And the potentially most potent payment reform strategy that appears in the bill is “bundling.” The legislation calls for the establishment of a national Medicare pilot program to “test, develop, and evaluate” bundled payment for acute inpatient hospital care, physician services, outpatient services, and post acute care for a single episode of care. According to estimates by researchers at Rand, a system of bundled payments, could potentially decrease national health spending by as much as 5.4% in the next 10 years (if applied to both Medicare and the private sector). The same researchers propose a 6.2% target for reducing spending on health care over the next 10 years; hence bundling alone could make an enormous difference.
The new law also provides incentives to health care systems to form “accountable care organizations” (essentially networks of providers that agree to capitation, another form of bundling) by offering them a share in the savings they generate for Medicare if they meet quality targets. It remains to be seen how widespread accountable care organizations will become. Health care reform also provides for an “Innovation Center” within CMS to evaluate, test, and expand different payment structures. Whether this provision will lead to savings depends on what payment structures are tested, how effective they are, and whether they are then disseminated. A final provision in the domain of payment reform is the establishment of an Independent Payment Advisory Board, charged with submitting legislative proposals to reduce the per capita rate of growth in Medicare spending whenever spending exceeds a target growth rate. However, the Board is prohibited from submitting proposals that will “ration care,” a provision, like the notorious “reasonable and necessary” language of the original Medicare statute, which will no doubt serve as the basis for rejecting any plan that restricts potentially useful treatment on the basis of cost.
Beyond payment reform, the new law will establish a Patient Centered Outcomes Research Institute to conduct research comparing the clinical effectiveness of alternative treatments. In principle, this kind of information could change medical practice to avoid the use of unnecessary or unnecessarily expensive treatments. But the bill has a built-in guarantee that the information will not be used in this way. It states that the findings of the Institute “may not be construed as mandates, guidelines, or recommendation for payment, coverage … or used to deny coverage.”
A powerful new law is on the books. With it, the U.S. finally joins all the other countries in the developed world in assuring a basic level of health care for its citizens. But will it constrain the rate of growth of spending on medical care? Only if we can depoliticize the boards, centers, and institutes that are the key to change.
A modified version of this article was posted on the Health Care Cost Monitor on March 19, 2010.
March 29, 2010
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March 11, 2010
Drugged in the Nursing home
This week’s Boston Globe featured an article blasting Massachusetts nursing homes for having too many residents on antipsychotic medication, “Nursing home drug use puts many at risk.” It portrayed vulnerable grandmothers as sedated, mute, and drooling, transformed by drugs into tragically diminished versions of their earlier vivacious selves. The headline could have been from the 1970s when Mary Mendelson wrote her muckraking book, “Tender Loving Greed,” pillorying the nursing home industry. Has nothing changed in the last 30 years?
A great deal has changed. In the 1980s, Congress responded to the deplorable state of nursing home care with the Nursing Home Reform Amendments, part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 (OBRA-87).This major piece of legislation sought to make nursing homes free of both physical and chemical restraints. And to a large extent it worked. Translated into regulations in 1991, OBRA-97 led to enormous declines in the use of antipsychotic as well as other “psychoactive” drugs such as benzodiazepines.
Then new, “atypical” antipsychotic medications came along. Touted as equally effective but less toxic, risperidone (Risperdal), olanzapine (Zyprexa), and quetiapine (Seroquel) appeared with growing frequency in nursing homes. Physicians were mandated by OBRA-87 to monitor the use of these drugs—to look for side effects such as Parkinsonian symptoms or drops in blood pressure. They were also supposed to limit prescription of these new drugs, along with other old fashioned or “typical” antipsychotics such as haloperidol (Haldol), to well-defined situations. The drugs were to be used for chronic schizophrenia and for dementia with psychotic features, unresponsive to alternative treatment. As the prevalence of dementia in nursing homes increased, so too did the prevalence of behavior problems: kicking, biting, smearing feces, and screaming. Less dramatic but nonetheless challenging were other behaviors that were also on the increase, such as pacing, wandering into other residents’ rooms, and urinating in trash cans. These behavioral disturbances wee extremely difficult for nursing home staff to manage. Convinced that the new “atypical” antipsychotics were the solution, physicians prescribed more and more of these drugs.
Some residents did improve. Most of them were not transformed into zombies by the medication. But the behavioral symptoms of dementia often come and go without pharmacological intervention. While many physicians were confident they were seeing a benefit of the drugs, others were not so sure. A large randomized trial
found that all three of the leading antipsychotics were equally effective in controlling symptoms—and indistinguishable in efficacy from placebo.
Nursing home physicians were skeptical. The study was conducted among outpatients. Maybe long term care residents were different from outpatients—surely they were more demented and had worse symptoms. But at around the same time came other disturbing news: the atypical antipsychotics were associated with a risk of sudden death. The FDA issued a new “black box” warning to physicians prescribing these drugs,followed 3 years later by another black box warning against using the older, “typical” antipsychotics. The drugs were not prohibited, but sober commentators advised prescribing them with great caution, restricting their use to patients with longstanding psychiatric illness and checking an EKG before and after starting the drugs.
In the face of all this bad news, how can it be that a recent study of over 16,000 nursing home admissions found that 29% received at least one antipsychotic over the course of a year? Of these, just about one-third had no identified clinical indication for the drug. Residents admitted to nursing homes with the highest baseline prescribing rates of antipsychotics were 1.37 times more likely than those admitted to nursing homes with the lowest baseline rates to receive a new antipsychotic prescription in the coming year.
Over-use of antipsychotics in the 1970s and 1980s was bad enough. In the intervening years, we have had regulation (OBRA-87), scientific studies of both efficacy and toxicity, and warnings from the FDA. What is going on?
The problem is that agitated behaviors in demented nursing home residents are a major challenge. There is no simple solution. Staff training can help. Increased staff: patient ratios can help. But with the rise of alternative options for care such as assisted living and a decline in the total number of people living in nursing homes, those individuals who do live in a nursing home tend to be more demented and have greater behavioral problems than ever before: in 2007, 69% of US nursing home residents had cognitive impairment, with 42% diagnosed with moderate to severe impairment. Solving the problem of how to care for demented nursing home residents will require far more sweeping changes than adding a few in-service programs for staff or hiring a few more nursing aides. The key is culture change.
To understand the role of culture change, we should look at the use of feeding tubes in nursing home patients with advanced dementia. The feeding tube story is in many ways similar to the antipsychotic medication story: the practice persists despite studies showing that feeding tubes do not prolong life, they do not prevent aspiration pneumonia, and they do not promote healing of pressure ulcers, the reasons given for their use. There is tremendous state-to-state variability in the use of feeding tubes. And while studies have identified a variety of institutional factors associated with feeding tube use (for-profit status of the nursing home, absence of advance care planning discussions, speech therapist on staff), there has been no deep understanding of why the rates vary so dramatically.
In the very same issue of the Archives of Internal Medicine that reported on the national use of antipsychotic drugs in nursing homes, Susan Mitchell and her colleagues presented an ethnographic study of two nursing homes to explore the role of nursing home culture in promoting the use of feeding tubes. In one nursing home, 42% of residents with advanced dementia had feeding tubes while in the other nursing home, only 11% had feeding tubes. The study found startling differences between the cultures of the two institutions. The low use nursing home had a home-like environment, specially trained nursing assistants, and lots of family involvement in decisions of the goals of care. The high-use facility, by contrast, had an institutional atmosphere, inadequately trained nursing assistants, and a focus on regulatory compliance rather than quality of life.
Preliminary evidence suggests that the same nursing homes that foster a culture conducive to hand feeding rather than tube feeding also have a low use of antipsychotic medications. Providence Mount St. Vincent’s, a nursing home in Seattle, Washington that pioneered the culture change model, reported a 100% decrease in the use of antipsychotic medications. If this is confirmed, it will provide compelling evidence that what matters most to nursing home residents, beyond rules and regulations, is designing a community that is patient-centered, where staff are cross-trained to provide multiple tasks, and that focuses on relationships. It is in homes like this that even individuals with advanced dementia may be able to flourish without either feeding tubes or antipsychotic medications.
A great deal has changed. In the 1980s, Congress responded to the deplorable state of nursing home care with the Nursing Home Reform Amendments, part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 (OBRA-87).This major piece of legislation sought to make nursing homes free of both physical and chemical restraints. And to a large extent it worked. Translated into regulations in 1991, OBRA-97 led to enormous declines in the use of antipsychotic as well as other “psychoactive” drugs such as benzodiazepines.
Then new, “atypical” antipsychotic medications came along. Touted as equally effective but less toxic, risperidone (Risperdal), olanzapine (Zyprexa), and quetiapine (Seroquel) appeared with growing frequency in nursing homes. Physicians were mandated by OBRA-87 to monitor the use of these drugs—to look for side effects such as Parkinsonian symptoms or drops in blood pressure. They were also supposed to limit prescription of these new drugs, along with other old fashioned or “typical” antipsychotics such as haloperidol (Haldol), to well-defined situations. The drugs were to be used for chronic schizophrenia and for dementia with psychotic features, unresponsive to alternative treatment. As the prevalence of dementia in nursing homes increased, so too did the prevalence of behavior problems: kicking, biting, smearing feces, and screaming. Less dramatic but nonetheless challenging were other behaviors that were also on the increase, such as pacing, wandering into other residents’ rooms, and urinating in trash cans. These behavioral disturbances wee extremely difficult for nursing home staff to manage. Convinced that the new “atypical” antipsychotics were the solution, physicians prescribed more and more of these drugs.
Some residents did improve. Most of them were not transformed into zombies by the medication. But the behavioral symptoms of dementia often come and go without pharmacological intervention. While many physicians were confident they were seeing a benefit of the drugs, others were not so sure. A large randomized trial
found that all three of the leading antipsychotics were equally effective in controlling symptoms—and indistinguishable in efficacy from placebo.
Nursing home physicians were skeptical. The study was conducted among outpatients. Maybe long term care residents were different from outpatients—surely they were more demented and had worse symptoms. But at around the same time came other disturbing news: the atypical antipsychotics were associated with a risk of sudden death. The FDA issued a new “black box” warning to physicians prescribing these drugs,followed 3 years later by another black box warning against using the older, “typical” antipsychotics. The drugs were not prohibited, but sober commentators advised prescribing them with great caution, restricting their use to patients with longstanding psychiatric illness and checking an EKG before and after starting the drugs.
In the face of all this bad news, how can it be that a recent study of over 16,000 nursing home admissions found that 29% received at least one antipsychotic over the course of a year? Of these, just about one-third had no identified clinical indication for the drug. Residents admitted to nursing homes with the highest baseline prescribing rates of antipsychotics were 1.37 times more likely than those admitted to nursing homes with the lowest baseline rates to receive a new antipsychotic prescription in the coming year.
Over-use of antipsychotics in the 1970s and 1980s was bad enough. In the intervening years, we have had regulation (OBRA-87), scientific studies of both efficacy and toxicity, and warnings from the FDA. What is going on?
The problem is that agitated behaviors in demented nursing home residents are a major challenge. There is no simple solution. Staff training can help. Increased staff: patient ratios can help. But with the rise of alternative options for care such as assisted living and a decline in the total number of people living in nursing homes, those individuals who do live in a nursing home tend to be more demented and have greater behavioral problems than ever before: in 2007, 69% of US nursing home residents had cognitive impairment, with 42% diagnosed with moderate to severe impairment. Solving the problem of how to care for demented nursing home residents will require far more sweeping changes than adding a few in-service programs for staff or hiring a few more nursing aides. The key is culture change.
To understand the role of culture change, we should look at the use of feeding tubes in nursing home patients with advanced dementia. The feeding tube story is in many ways similar to the antipsychotic medication story: the practice persists despite studies showing that feeding tubes do not prolong life, they do not prevent aspiration pneumonia, and they do not promote healing of pressure ulcers, the reasons given for their use. There is tremendous state-to-state variability in the use of feeding tubes. And while studies have identified a variety of institutional factors associated with feeding tube use (for-profit status of the nursing home, absence of advance care planning discussions, speech therapist on staff), there has been no deep understanding of why the rates vary so dramatically.
In the very same issue of the Archives of Internal Medicine that reported on the national use of antipsychotic drugs in nursing homes, Susan Mitchell and her colleagues presented an ethnographic study of two nursing homes to explore the role of nursing home culture in promoting the use of feeding tubes. In one nursing home, 42% of residents with advanced dementia had feeding tubes while in the other nursing home, only 11% had feeding tubes. The study found startling differences between the cultures of the two institutions. The low use nursing home had a home-like environment, specially trained nursing assistants, and lots of family involvement in decisions of the goals of care. The high-use facility, by contrast, had an institutional atmosphere, inadequately trained nursing assistants, and a focus on regulatory compliance rather than quality of life.
Preliminary evidence suggests that the same nursing homes that foster a culture conducive to hand feeding rather than tube feeding also have a low use of antipsychotic medications. Providence Mount St. Vincent’s, a nursing home in Seattle, Washington that pioneered the culture change model, reported a 100% decrease in the use of antipsychotic medications. If this is confirmed, it will provide compelling evidence that what matters most to nursing home residents, beyond rules and regulations, is designing a community that is patient-centered, where staff are cross-trained to provide multiple tasks, and that focuses on relationships. It is in homes like this that even individuals with advanced dementia may be able to flourish without either feeding tubes or antipsychotic medications.
January 04, 2010
When Lawyers Practice Medicine
I sat with my elderly parents and their estate planning lawyer, going over documents. The lawyer had updated their will, revised their powers of attorney, and done various other lawyerly things. She handed my parents page after page for them to sign. After an hour of this, my eyes began glazing over. But then I heard her say “and here’s your living will,” and I was all ears.
My work as a geriatrician and palliative care specialist revolves around advance care planning, discussions with patients about their preferences for medical care in the event they lose the ability to make decisions. It’s a complicated enterprise that begins with clarifying the person’s overall health, then moves on to determine the goals of care—what is most important at that point in time—and then seeks to translate those goals into a plan of action. What I have learned by doing this with hundred of patients and their families, as well as by studying and writing about it, is that it is a process. Other researchers and practitioners in the field agree that advance care planning is not about completing a form, it’s about discussing prognosis, it’s about explaining what medical interventions can and cannot achieve and the burdens associated with them, and it’s about factoring the patient’s values and preferences into this complex discussion. What was an estate lawyer doing handing out a living will document and saying “sign here?”
Clearly the lawyer thought the document was self-explanatory and that most people would want to sign such a form. Clearly she believed it was her responsibility to offer such a form to my parents and she felt she was providing them the opportunity to retain control over their medical care at the end of life.
The irony is that Massachusetts, where this encounter between my parents and their attorney took place, does not have living will legislation. In Massachusetts, the only legally recognized form of advance care planning is a health care proxy—choosing who is empowered to make decisions if the patient loses the capacity to speak for himself. The Massachusetts legislature deliberately opted not to accord official status to living wills because they are vague, ambiguous, and seldom applicable to real life medical situations.
The living will my parents were given is a classic example of pseudo-precision: “If a situation should arise in which there is no reasonable expectation of my recovery from extreme physical or mental disability, I direct that I be allowed to die and not be kept alive by medications or artificial means or procedures which serve only to prolong the process of my dying,” it begins. What is a “reasonable expectation of recovery?” A fifty-fifty chance? Is a 30% chance good enough? 10%? What does “recovery” mean anyway? Going home and living independently? Living in a nursing home and needing help with bathing and dressing? Going from unconsciousness and total paralysis to wakefulness and the ability to move one finger?
But there is more—the document seems, at first glance, to spell out the answers to these questions. It says “without limitation, I intend these instructions to apply if I am (i) terminally ill, (ii) permanently unconscious, or (iii) conscious, but have irreversible brain damage and there is no reasonable expectation that I will regain the ability to make decisions and express my wishes.” What is meant by “terminally ill?” Does it mean conforming to the Medicare hospice definition of having a life-expectancy of 6 months or less, if the disease follows its usual course? Does it mean death is imminent—in the next few hours or days? Or does it mean having a disease that is uniformly fatal, such as Alzheimer’s disease, which lasts 3-5 years, sometimes longer, from diagnosis until death? What is “extreme physical or mental disability?” Does this mean the most advanced stage of Alzheimer’s, or does moderately severe dementia—in which the individual can walk and talk, but has completely lost his short term memory and needs help with bathing, toileting, and personal care—qualify?
That’s not all. If my parents did seem to fall into any of the 3 categories of terminal illness, permanent unconsciousness, or irreversible brain damage, then it specifies that they would not want “ (a) electrical or mechanical resuscitation of my heart when it has stopped beating; (b) artificial nutrition or hydration when I am unable to take nourishment by mouth; (c) mechanical respiration when I am no longer able to sustain my own breathing; and (d) medications, tests and treatments for any purpose other than comfort.” There is no explanation of what any of these interventions entails and their benefits and burdens, nor is there any explanation of what the alternative might be. In principle, if my parents had a stroke that impaired decision-making capacity and the ability to swallow, but were awake and alert, they would not be given a feeding tube for nutrition, even if they were hungry and indicated they wanted to eat. In principle, if they were diagnosed with a fatal cancer and had a life expectancy of less than six months and were unable to make decisions for themselves, they could not receive radiation treatments to prolong life or antibiotics to cure a pneumonia.
Not only does this kind of living will potentially limit the use of treatment that might well be entirely appropriate and consistent with my parents’ wishes (if they understood what they were signing), but it also fails to protect them from overtreatment in most of the clinical situations which they are likely to encounter.
Whatever is meant by being “terminally ill” or suffering from “irreversible brain damage” with “no reasonable expectation that I will regain the ability to make decisions,” these are not the situations in which older people commonly find themselves. They find themselves in a whole host of situations in which they might well want limitation of treatment. Many 85-year olds, for example, have mild dementia, heart disease, arthritis, and diabetes. If they develop a severe pneumonia, another common scenario, this might well precipitate “delirium,” an acute confusional state in which they were unable to make medical decisions. Would they want to be put in an intensive care unit on a ventilator? The living will, which is supposed to guide proxies and physicians, is silent on this issue.
This seemingly innocuous living will, in short, failed to protect my parents from excessively burdensome treatments in a variety of very possible medical situations, and could prevent them from receiving desirable treatments in other situations. So how could they assure they would get the kind of treatment they wanted if they were unable to speak for themselves?
The answer is that they could discuss with their physician what sorts of medical interventions are consistent with their goals. Frail elders, for instance, if they wish to remain independent as long as possible, even if it means a few months less life, should opt to forgo attempted cardiopulmonary resuscitation. The reason is that CPR, when performed in this setting, is rarely successful, and in those instances where the person survives, he almost always experiences a significant decline in his ability to function on his own. Ideally, the health care proxy is present when the physician talks to the patient about preferences for care, so he will be well-positioned to carry out the patient’s wishes. It is important for the physician to document such discussions in the patient’s medical record. Formal “instructional directives” that spell out just which procedures a patient thinks he would want under what circumstances may be useful as a supplement to advance care planning discussions. An example is the “Five Wishes,” available from Aging With Dignity.
It is entirely appropriate for lawyers to give their clients a health care proxy form to sign—although it should be pointed out that no legal input is required to choose a surrogate. Anyone can print up the official Massachusetts health care proxy form and sign it, with two adult witnesses. There is no need to pay an attorney $100/hour for such a form. It is also reasonable to recommend to clients that they discuss with their doctor their preferences for medical care—in the context of their medical situation and their personal goals. At best, presenting clients with a living will and suggesting they sign it reduces the complex process of advance care planning to filling out a form. At worst, it is practicing medicine without a license. Is the lawyer in any position to explain the benefits and burdens of the medical interventions referred to in the living will, such as a ventilator (“mechanical respiration when I am no longer able to sustain my own breathing”), a feeding tube (“artificial nutrition…when I am unable to take nourishment by mouth”), or cardiopulmonary resuscitation (“electrical or mechanical resuscitation of my heart when it has stopped beating”)?
Physicians have shirked their responsibility by only sporadically engaging in advance care planning with their patients. The result is that lawyers are taking up the slack. Many state legislatures have contributed to the unfortunate conceptualization of advance medical planning as a legal issue through advance directive legislation: unlike Massachusetts, most states have living will laws as well as health care proxy laws and even prescribe what forms are legally recognized in their state. We need to reclaim advance care planning as a medical intervention that can prevent both over-treatment and under-treatment near the end of life.
My work as a geriatrician and palliative care specialist revolves around advance care planning, discussions with patients about their preferences for medical care in the event they lose the ability to make decisions. It’s a complicated enterprise that begins with clarifying the person’s overall health, then moves on to determine the goals of care—what is most important at that point in time—and then seeks to translate those goals into a plan of action. What I have learned by doing this with hundred of patients and their families, as well as by studying and writing about it, is that it is a process. Other researchers and practitioners in the field agree that advance care planning is not about completing a form, it’s about discussing prognosis, it’s about explaining what medical interventions can and cannot achieve and the burdens associated with them, and it’s about factoring the patient’s values and preferences into this complex discussion. What was an estate lawyer doing handing out a living will document and saying “sign here?”
Clearly the lawyer thought the document was self-explanatory and that most people would want to sign such a form. Clearly she believed it was her responsibility to offer such a form to my parents and she felt she was providing them the opportunity to retain control over their medical care at the end of life.
The irony is that Massachusetts, where this encounter between my parents and their attorney took place, does not have living will legislation. In Massachusetts, the only legally recognized form of advance care planning is a health care proxy—choosing who is empowered to make decisions if the patient loses the capacity to speak for himself. The Massachusetts legislature deliberately opted not to accord official status to living wills because they are vague, ambiguous, and seldom applicable to real life medical situations.
The living will my parents were given is a classic example of pseudo-precision: “If a situation should arise in which there is no reasonable expectation of my recovery from extreme physical or mental disability, I direct that I be allowed to die and not be kept alive by medications or artificial means or procedures which serve only to prolong the process of my dying,” it begins. What is a “reasonable expectation of recovery?” A fifty-fifty chance? Is a 30% chance good enough? 10%? What does “recovery” mean anyway? Going home and living independently? Living in a nursing home and needing help with bathing and dressing? Going from unconsciousness and total paralysis to wakefulness and the ability to move one finger?
But there is more—the document seems, at first glance, to spell out the answers to these questions. It says “without limitation, I intend these instructions to apply if I am (i) terminally ill, (ii) permanently unconscious, or (iii) conscious, but have irreversible brain damage and there is no reasonable expectation that I will regain the ability to make decisions and express my wishes.” What is meant by “terminally ill?” Does it mean conforming to the Medicare hospice definition of having a life-expectancy of 6 months or less, if the disease follows its usual course? Does it mean death is imminent—in the next few hours or days? Or does it mean having a disease that is uniformly fatal, such as Alzheimer’s disease, which lasts 3-5 years, sometimes longer, from diagnosis until death? What is “extreme physical or mental disability?” Does this mean the most advanced stage of Alzheimer’s, or does moderately severe dementia—in which the individual can walk and talk, but has completely lost his short term memory and needs help with bathing, toileting, and personal care—qualify?
That’s not all. If my parents did seem to fall into any of the 3 categories of terminal illness, permanent unconsciousness, or irreversible brain damage, then it specifies that they would not want “ (a) electrical or mechanical resuscitation of my heart when it has stopped beating; (b) artificial nutrition or hydration when I am unable to take nourishment by mouth; (c) mechanical respiration when I am no longer able to sustain my own breathing; and (d) medications, tests and treatments for any purpose other than comfort.” There is no explanation of what any of these interventions entails and their benefits and burdens, nor is there any explanation of what the alternative might be. In principle, if my parents had a stroke that impaired decision-making capacity and the ability to swallow, but were awake and alert, they would not be given a feeding tube for nutrition, even if they were hungry and indicated they wanted to eat. In principle, if they were diagnosed with a fatal cancer and had a life expectancy of less than six months and were unable to make decisions for themselves, they could not receive radiation treatments to prolong life or antibiotics to cure a pneumonia.
Not only does this kind of living will potentially limit the use of treatment that might well be entirely appropriate and consistent with my parents’ wishes (if they understood what they were signing), but it also fails to protect them from overtreatment in most of the clinical situations which they are likely to encounter.
Whatever is meant by being “terminally ill” or suffering from “irreversible brain damage” with “no reasonable expectation that I will regain the ability to make decisions,” these are not the situations in which older people commonly find themselves. They find themselves in a whole host of situations in which they might well want limitation of treatment. Many 85-year olds, for example, have mild dementia, heart disease, arthritis, and diabetes. If they develop a severe pneumonia, another common scenario, this might well precipitate “delirium,” an acute confusional state in which they were unable to make medical decisions. Would they want to be put in an intensive care unit on a ventilator? The living will, which is supposed to guide proxies and physicians, is silent on this issue.
This seemingly innocuous living will, in short, failed to protect my parents from excessively burdensome treatments in a variety of very possible medical situations, and could prevent them from receiving desirable treatments in other situations. So how could they assure they would get the kind of treatment they wanted if they were unable to speak for themselves?
The answer is that they could discuss with their physician what sorts of medical interventions are consistent with their goals. Frail elders, for instance, if they wish to remain independent as long as possible, even if it means a few months less life, should opt to forgo attempted cardiopulmonary resuscitation. The reason is that CPR, when performed in this setting, is rarely successful, and in those instances where the person survives, he almost always experiences a significant decline in his ability to function on his own. Ideally, the health care proxy is present when the physician talks to the patient about preferences for care, so he will be well-positioned to carry out the patient’s wishes. It is important for the physician to document such discussions in the patient’s medical record. Formal “instructional directives” that spell out just which procedures a patient thinks he would want under what circumstances may be useful as a supplement to advance care planning discussions. An example is the “Five Wishes,” available from Aging With Dignity.
It is entirely appropriate for lawyers to give their clients a health care proxy form to sign—although it should be pointed out that no legal input is required to choose a surrogate. Anyone can print up the official Massachusetts health care proxy form and sign it, with two adult witnesses. There is no need to pay an attorney $100/hour for such a form. It is also reasonable to recommend to clients that they discuss with their doctor their preferences for medical care—in the context of their medical situation and their personal goals. At best, presenting clients with a living will and suggesting they sign it reduces the complex process of advance care planning to filling out a form. At worst, it is practicing medicine without a license. Is the lawyer in any position to explain the benefits and burdens of the medical interventions referred to in the living will, such as a ventilator (“mechanical respiration when I am no longer able to sustain my own breathing”), a feeding tube (“artificial nutrition…when I am unable to take nourishment by mouth”), or cardiopulmonary resuscitation (“electrical or mechanical resuscitation of my heart when it has stopped beating”)?
Physicians have shirked their responsibility by only sporadically engaging in advance care planning with their patients. The result is that lawyers are taking up the slack. Many state legislatures have contributed to the unfortunate conceptualization of advance medical planning as a legal issue through advance directive legislation: unlike Massachusetts, most states have living will laws as well as health care proxy laws and even prescribe what forms are legally recognized in their state. We need to reclaim advance care planning as a medical intervention that can prevent both over-treatment and under-treatment near the end of life.
November 30, 2009
The Heart of the Matter
Just before the annual deluge of holiday visitors began inundating the Magic Kingdom, over 20,000 people gathered in Orlando, Florida to attend the American Heart Association annual meeting. At one late-breaking scientific session, Dr. Joseph Rogers, a Duke University cardiologist, presented the results of a study of a nifty new cardiac device, the HeartMate II (to distinguish it from its predecessor, HeartMate I, also known as HeartMate XVE). This remarkable 390-gram contraption is the next best thing to a heart transplant for patients with severe heart failure. It is a “ventricular assist device,” (VAD) implanted in the abdomen, hooked up to the heart to propel blood through a failing ventricle, and powered by an external generator. The study, published the very same day in the online version of the New England Journal of Medicine, showed that patients with the new device lived longer and better, with fewer complications, than those who got the earlier variety.
Just six years ago, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) approved use of the HeartMate I in Medicare patients as “destination” or definitive treatment of severe heart failure. Based on the results of a 2001 study, the REMATCH (Randomized Evaluation of Mechanical Assistance for the Treatment of Congestive Heart Failure) trial, CMS concluded that the device was “reasonable and necessary” for the treatment of advanced heart failure and therefore, as required by its 1965 Congressional mandate, agreed to pay for implantation of the device.
Physicians, however, were not convinced the device was reasonable or necessary. In fact, the number of patients receiving a ventricular assist device has fallen every year since CMS approved its use. Between March, 2006 and June, 2009, a total of only 1664 HeartMate I’s were implanted (just under 500 per year) and 90% of them were used as “bridge to transplant,” that is to tide patients over until a heart became available for transplant, rather than as “destination therapy,” or permanent treatment. Physicians evidently were not impressed by the data that patients who had a ventricular assist device lived longer than those receiving “maximal medical therapy.” Even with the device, one-year mortality remained high at 48% and two-year mortality at 77%. Moreover, HeartMate I recipients were at risk of stroke, infection, and device malfunction.
Will physicians be more enthusiastic about the new HeartMate II? It is smaller—small enough to fit into a woman, unlike the earlier version. It uses a continuous rotary system rather than a pulsatile mechanism, which means it’s quieter and more durable. And the new device is clearly superior to the old one—the randomized study reported in Orlando found that 46% of those with the new device were alive after 2 years without having sustained a debilitating stroke or required replacement of the device, compared to 11% of those who got the original model. Quality of life was also improved, with recipients of the new HeartMate able to walk further and do more for themselves.
Are these results good enough? They will almost surely be good enough for the Food and Drug Administration to approve use of the device as destination therapy and for Medicare to follow suit by approving reimbursement in Medicare patients—currently Medicare pays an average of $177,000 for a hospitalization in which a ventricular assist device is inserted. Whether physicians will regard the new pump as ready for prime time remains to be seen.
The deeper question is whether we should be putting more and more resources into shoring up failing hearts in patients near the end of life or whether, instead, we should concentrate on palliative care for patients dying of heart failure and on prevention to avoid the development of heart failure in the first place.
Palliative care is an effective, well-regarded approach to end stage heart failure. It focuses on comfort and on supporting patients and their families as the end draws near and may involve enrollment in hospice. Individuals whose heart cannot pump properly repeatedly suffer from fluid backing up into their lungs, swelling their legs, and filling their abdomen, causing shortness of breath, difficulty walking, and fatigue. Instead of hospitalizing these patients, often transferring them to the Intensive Care Unit where they may be attached to a ventilator that forces oxygen into their lungs and put on an intravenous drip to try to stimulate the heart to contract more forcefully, palliative care strives to keep them home. At home they use oxygen and medication such as morphine to help them breathe. Interestingly, the studies of the left ventricular assist device compare patients receiving one particular device to those getting another type (the new study) or patients receiving a device to patients receiving “maximal medical therapy” (the earlier study), but never compare patients receiving a device to those getting palliative care.
Prevention makes a lot of sense in the case of heart failure. Heart failure is the leading cause of hospitalization in individuals over age 65. Americans have a 20% life time risk of developing the condition and treatment costs the US upwards of $30 billion per year. But we know what causes the heart to fail: it is high blood pressure, diabetes, or coronary artery disease (which in turn is caused by some combination of high blood pressure, diabetes, high cholesterol and smoking). And every one of these predisposing conditions is treatable or preventable. While there are few good studies of what it would cost to institute a comprehensive set of measures to prevent heart failure, we do know that 82% of the cardiac events in one observational study, the Nurses Health Study, were attributable to diet and lifestyle issues. An Australian analysis suggests that the best way to prevent heart failure is by a combination of medical preventive strategies (proceeding patient by patient to assess risk factors and intervene to treat high blood pressure, diabetes, and high cholesterol) and public health strategies (using legislative and environmental approaches to promote a healthy lifestyle).
America has its heart set on the technological fix—the HeartMate II is the latest in a series of ingenious approaches to treating the chronic diseases afflicting older people. But its time to get to the heart of the matter, trying to prevent the major scourges that we have the knowhow to avoid, and palliating those who, despite our best efforts, are dying.
Just six years ago, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) approved use of the HeartMate I in Medicare patients as “destination” or definitive treatment of severe heart failure. Based on the results of a 2001 study, the REMATCH (Randomized Evaluation of Mechanical Assistance for the Treatment of Congestive Heart Failure) trial, CMS concluded that the device was “reasonable and necessary” for the treatment of advanced heart failure and therefore, as required by its 1965 Congressional mandate, agreed to pay for implantation of the device.
Physicians, however, were not convinced the device was reasonable or necessary. In fact, the number of patients receiving a ventricular assist device has fallen every year since CMS approved its use. Between March, 2006 and June, 2009, a total of only 1664 HeartMate I’s were implanted (just under 500 per year) and 90% of them were used as “bridge to transplant,” that is to tide patients over until a heart became available for transplant, rather than as “destination therapy,” or permanent treatment. Physicians evidently were not impressed by the data that patients who had a ventricular assist device lived longer than those receiving “maximal medical therapy.” Even with the device, one-year mortality remained high at 48% and two-year mortality at 77%. Moreover, HeartMate I recipients were at risk of stroke, infection, and device malfunction.
Will physicians be more enthusiastic about the new HeartMate II? It is smaller—small enough to fit into a woman, unlike the earlier version. It uses a continuous rotary system rather than a pulsatile mechanism, which means it’s quieter and more durable. And the new device is clearly superior to the old one—the randomized study reported in Orlando found that 46% of those with the new device were alive after 2 years without having sustained a debilitating stroke or required replacement of the device, compared to 11% of those who got the original model. Quality of life was also improved, with recipients of the new HeartMate able to walk further and do more for themselves.
Are these results good enough? They will almost surely be good enough for the Food and Drug Administration to approve use of the device as destination therapy and for Medicare to follow suit by approving reimbursement in Medicare patients—currently Medicare pays an average of $177,000 for a hospitalization in which a ventricular assist device is inserted. Whether physicians will regard the new pump as ready for prime time remains to be seen.
The deeper question is whether we should be putting more and more resources into shoring up failing hearts in patients near the end of life or whether, instead, we should concentrate on palliative care for patients dying of heart failure and on prevention to avoid the development of heart failure in the first place.
Palliative care is an effective, well-regarded approach to end stage heart failure. It focuses on comfort and on supporting patients and their families as the end draws near and may involve enrollment in hospice. Individuals whose heart cannot pump properly repeatedly suffer from fluid backing up into their lungs, swelling their legs, and filling their abdomen, causing shortness of breath, difficulty walking, and fatigue. Instead of hospitalizing these patients, often transferring them to the Intensive Care Unit where they may be attached to a ventilator that forces oxygen into their lungs and put on an intravenous drip to try to stimulate the heart to contract more forcefully, palliative care strives to keep them home. At home they use oxygen and medication such as morphine to help them breathe. Interestingly, the studies of the left ventricular assist device compare patients receiving one particular device to those getting another type (the new study) or patients receiving a device to patients receiving “maximal medical therapy” (the earlier study), but never compare patients receiving a device to those getting palliative care.
Prevention makes a lot of sense in the case of heart failure. Heart failure is the leading cause of hospitalization in individuals over age 65. Americans have a 20% life time risk of developing the condition and treatment costs the US upwards of $30 billion per year. But we know what causes the heart to fail: it is high blood pressure, diabetes, or coronary artery disease (which in turn is caused by some combination of high blood pressure, diabetes, high cholesterol and smoking). And every one of these predisposing conditions is treatable or preventable. While there are few good studies of what it would cost to institute a comprehensive set of measures to prevent heart failure, we do know that 82% of the cardiac events in one observational study, the Nurses Health Study, were attributable to diet and lifestyle issues. An Australian analysis suggests that the best way to prevent heart failure is by a combination of medical preventive strategies (proceeding patient by patient to assess risk factors and intervene to treat high blood pressure, diabetes, and high cholesterol) and public health strategies (using legislative and environmental approaches to promote a healthy lifestyle).
America has its heart set on the technological fix—the HeartMate II is the latest in a series of ingenious approaches to treating the chronic diseases afflicting older people. But its time to get to the heart of the matter, trying to prevent the major scourges that we have the knowhow to avoid, and palliating those who, despite our best efforts, are dying.
October 15, 2009
Balking at Baucus?
Democrats and Republicans alike are balking at the Baucus proposal, the latest health care reform proposal to emerge from Congress. Not surprisingly, this enormous bill has something for everyone to hate. It attempts to legislate improvements in access and quality while simultaneously addressing cost.
But what is sometimes lost in the furor is that there are actually two kinds of costs that reform must deal with: the cost of implementing the new programs (principally the cost of requiring that most Americans have health insurance, which means subsidizing premiums for individuals with low incomes); and the rising cost of health care, principally the Medicare program, which is expected to run out of money in 2017.
The Baucus proposal has a price tag of $774 billion over 10 years (though in the last few days, various modifications have added another $28 billion), which refers to the first kind of cost. But how does the Baucus proposal address the second cost issue, containing spending?
The Congressional Budget Office predicts that total spending on health care will reach 36 percent of gross domestic product by 2035, with Medicare costs alone comprising 8 percent of GDP. The vast majority of the increase in Medicare costs will be attributable to increased spending per enrollee, not to the aging of the population. And the single most important factor accounting for the increases is the emergence, adoption, and widespread diffusion of new medical technologies.
Some of these technologies are clearly beneficial; others are beneficial to some of those who receive the new drugs or devices, but are unnecessary or even harmful to numerous others for whom they are also prescribed. And some of the beneficial technologies produce only a very small benefit but at an extremely high cost, as set by the pharmaceutical or device manufacturing industries. Effective Medicare cost control will need to go beyond appealing proposals of dubious financial benefit such as expansion of preventive services and elimination of Medicare fraud (though this could save as much as $17.2 billion per year if fraud were totally eradicated).
What else does the Baucus bill suggest? It makes three significant proposals that actually might work. Collectively, they seek to modify the culture of medicine by altering the way medical care is delivered and how it is paid for.
The beauty and the peril of its strategy is to create an infrastructure for designing a program rather than actually spelling out what the program will be. The beauty is that it does not require making politically unpalatable claims, for example that CMS may need to stop reimbursing for technologies that are not cost effective. The peril is that the various centers and institutes the plan will spawn may not in fact do what they need to in order to control costs. Just what are these centers and institutes?
The most familiar one, because it is also found in the “Affordable Health Choices Act” of both the Senate and the House, is a nonprofit patient-centered outcomes research institute. This would conduct research comparing the clinical effectiveness of medical treatments. To be effective, its work would need to translate into the CMS reimbursement policies: it would have to become an extra-government agency along the lines of the much-maligned but crucially necessary British National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE).
The second new institution is an independent Medicare commission charged with submitting proposals for reducing excess Medicare cost growth. Strong wording would effectively require Congress to do what the commission requested or come up with a fiscally equivalent alternative. This is an example of the politically astute approach of leaving open just what the independent commission would recommend.
The third institution is an innovation center within CMS to test, evaluate, and expand different payment structures and methodologies to foster patient-centered care, improve quality, and slow Medicare cost growth. Among other endeavors, the center is mandated to pilot the development and evaluation of a system of bundled payments for a single episode of care – that is, a single payment covering care in the office, the hospital, and the skilled nursing facility. For bundling to work, doctors, nursing facilities, and hospitals will need to band together to form accountable care organizations, and Baucus promotes the establishment of these organizations by offering them a share in the cost savings they generate.
Will the research institute, the commission, and the innovation center, with it assorted pilot programs, do the job? Without knowing just what they will recommend, it is impossible to be sure. But their focus will be on the right areas: figuring out what works and what doesn’t, determining who benefits from new technologies and by how much, and developing systems of care that assure that patients get the interventions that work but not those that don’t. It’s our best shot to date.
This article appeared on the Hastings Center HealthCareCostMonitor on September 24, 2009.
Read more: http://healthcarecostmonitor.thehastingscenter.org/murielgillick/baulking-at-baucus/
But what is sometimes lost in the furor is that there are actually two kinds of costs that reform must deal with: the cost of implementing the new programs (principally the cost of requiring that most Americans have health insurance, which means subsidizing premiums for individuals with low incomes); and the rising cost of health care, principally the Medicare program, which is expected to run out of money in 2017.
The Baucus proposal has a price tag of $774 billion over 10 years (though in the last few days, various modifications have added another $28 billion), which refers to the first kind of cost. But how does the Baucus proposal address the second cost issue, containing spending?
The Congressional Budget Office predicts that total spending on health care will reach 36 percent of gross domestic product by 2035, with Medicare costs alone comprising 8 percent of GDP. The vast majority of the increase in Medicare costs will be attributable to increased spending per enrollee, not to the aging of the population. And the single most important factor accounting for the increases is the emergence, adoption, and widespread diffusion of new medical technologies.
Some of these technologies are clearly beneficial; others are beneficial to some of those who receive the new drugs or devices, but are unnecessary or even harmful to numerous others for whom they are also prescribed. And some of the beneficial technologies produce only a very small benefit but at an extremely high cost, as set by the pharmaceutical or device manufacturing industries. Effective Medicare cost control will need to go beyond appealing proposals of dubious financial benefit such as expansion of preventive services and elimination of Medicare fraud (though this could save as much as $17.2 billion per year if fraud were totally eradicated).
What else does the Baucus bill suggest? It makes three significant proposals that actually might work. Collectively, they seek to modify the culture of medicine by altering the way medical care is delivered and how it is paid for.
The beauty and the peril of its strategy is to create an infrastructure for designing a program rather than actually spelling out what the program will be. The beauty is that it does not require making politically unpalatable claims, for example that CMS may need to stop reimbursing for technologies that are not cost effective. The peril is that the various centers and institutes the plan will spawn may not in fact do what they need to in order to control costs. Just what are these centers and institutes?
The most familiar one, because it is also found in the “Affordable Health Choices Act” of both the Senate and the House, is a nonprofit patient-centered outcomes research institute. This would conduct research comparing the clinical effectiveness of medical treatments. To be effective, its work would need to translate into the CMS reimbursement policies: it would have to become an extra-government agency along the lines of the much-maligned but crucially necessary British National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE).
The second new institution is an independent Medicare commission charged with submitting proposals for reducing excess Medicare cost growth. Strong wording would effectively require Congress to do what the commission requested or come up with a fiscally equivalent alternative. This is an example of the politically astute approach of leaving open just what the independent commission would recommend.
The third institution is an innovation center within CMS to test, evaluate, and expand different payment structures and methodologies to foster patient-centered care, improve quality, and slow Medicare cost growth. Among other endeavors, the center is mandated to pilot the development and evaluation of a system of bundled payments for a single episode of care – that is, a single payment covering care in the office, the hospital, and the skilled nursing facility. For bundling to work, doctors, nursing facilities, and hospitals will need to band together to form accountable care organizations, and Baucus promotes the establishment of these organizations by offering them a share in the cost savings they generate.
Will the research institute, the commission, and the innovation center, with it assorted pilot programs, do the job? Without knowing just what they will recommend, it is impossible to be sure. But their focus will be on the right areas: figuring out what works and what doesn’t, determining who benefits from new technologies and by how much, and developing systems of care that assure that patients get the interventions that work but not those that don’t. It’s our best shot to date.
This article appeared on the Hastings Center HealthCareCostMonitor on September 24, 2009.
Read more: http://healthcarecostmonitor.thehastingscenter.org/murielgillick/baulking-at-baucus/
End-of-Life Planning is No Conspiracy
Far from a left-wing conspiracy to deprive you of desirable care near the end of life, advance care planning - talking with one’s physician about goals and preferences for medical care in the event of incapacity - is the best way to ensure that your wishes are respected if you lose the capacity to speak for yourself. Because it is widely recognized as the ideal way to prevent both over-treatment and under-treatment, it has become the standard of care over the past 15 years.
Survey after survey indicates that most patients want to have end-of-life discussions but most do not have them. For example, a 2005 AARP survey in Massachusetts of members over age 50 found that 89 percent of those polled rated having honest answers from their doctor about end-of-life conditions as very important but only 17 percent had discussed their preferences for such care with their physicians. Study after study also shows that American patients continue to die in pain, on ventilators, and in the intensive care unit, though many of them did not want such treatment at the end of their lives. For instance, the Robert Wood Johnson study “Means to A Better End: A Report on Dying in America Today’’ found that 42 percent of all nursing home residents were persistently in pain, and the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care found that 18 percent of deaths nationwide take place in intensive care units and 32 percent in the hospital, although the majority of Americans say they would prefer to die at home.
When physicians are asked why they do not regularly engage in advance care planning with their patients, they report that they do not have the time for such conversations. The legislation under consideration in Congress that would allow physicians to be reimbursed for an advance care planning discussion with their patients is simply an attempt to correct the imbalance between what patients want and clinical reality.
The current proposal is far from the first attempt to facilitate advance care planning. The federal Patient Self-Determination Act of 1990 mandates that all patients admitted to a healthcare facility receiving Medicare or Medicaid funding be asked if they have an advance directive (a written document specifying their wishes in the event of incapacity) and be given information about advance directives if they do not have one. Every state as well as the District of Columbia has advance directive legislation, which provides for the use of a living will (a statement about preferences in particular clinical situations) or designation of a healthcare proxy (a person to make medical decisions in the event the patient loses the capacity to do so) or both.
The only question we should be discussing is whether a federal mandate to allow physicians to bill specifically for discussions about goals and directives for care will actually succeed in stimulating advance care planning. That is why the bill calls for monitoring the use of the planning code - if it is ineffective in promoting end-of-life discussions, then we will need to find other strategies. The issue is not whether advance care planning is desirable; it is how best to encourage patients, families, and clinicians to have such conversations.
The reason it is important to have the conversations is that death is not optional. What is optional is how we will experience life’s last stage: Will we be in pain or will we be comfortable? Will we be in the hospital or at home? Will we be in an intensive care unit or enrolled in hospice? Discussions about end-of-life care have been shown to result in patients experiencing less depression, less pain, and less anxiety in their final days. Advance care planning gives us the opportunity to avoid both over- and under-treatment by allowing us to express our preferences and by discussing them with our personal physician.
This article appeared as an op-ed in the Boston Globe on August, 12, 2009.
Survey after survey indicates that most patients want to have end-of-life discussions but most do not have them. For example, a 2005 AARP survey in Massachusetts of members over age 50 found that 89 percent of those polled rated having honest answers from their doctor about end-of-life conditions as very important but only 17 percent had discussed their preferences for such care with their physicians. Study after study also shows that American patients continue to die in pain, on ventilators, and in the intensive care unit, though many of them did not want such treatment at the end of their lives. For instance, the Robert Wood Johnson study “Means to A Better End: A Report on Dying in America Today’’ found that 42 percent of all nursing home residents were persistently in pain, and the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care found that 18 percent of deaths nationwide take place in intensive care units and 32 percent in the hospital, although the majority of Americans say they would prefer to die at home.
When physicians are asked why they do not regularly engage in advance care planning with their patients, they report that they do not have the time for such conversations. The legislation under consideration in Congress that would allow physicians to be reimbursed for an advance care planning discussion with their patients is simply an attempt to correct the imbalance between what patients want and clinical reality.
The current proposal is far from the first attempt to facilitate advance care planning. The federal Patient Self-Determination Act of 1990 mandates that all patients admitted to a healthcare facility receiving Medicare or Medicaid funding be asked if they have an advance directive (a written document specifying their wishes in the event of incapacity) and be given information about advance directives if they do not have one. Every state as well as the District of Columbia has advance directive legislation, which provides for the use of a living will (a statement about preferences in particular clinical situations) or designation of a healthcare proxy (a person to make medical decisions in the event the patient loses the capacity to do so) or both.
The only question we should be discussing is whether a federal mandate to allow physicians to bill specifically for discussions about goals and directives for care will actually succeed in stimulating advance care planning. That is why the bill calls for monitoring the use of the planning code - if it is ineffective in promoting end-of-life discussions, then we will need to find other strategies. The issue is not whether advance care planning is desirable; it is how best to encourage patients, families, and clinicians to have such conversations.
The reason it is important to have the conversations is that death is not optional. What is optional is how we will experience life’s last stage: Will we be in pain or will we be comfortable? Will we be in the hospital or at home? Will we be in an intensive care unit or enrolled in hospice? Discussions about end-of-life care have been shown to result in patients experiencing less depression, less pain, and less anxiety in their final days. Advance care planning gives us the opportunity to avoid both over- and under-treatment by allowing us to express our preferences and by discussing them with our personal physician.
This article appeared as an op-ed in the Boston Globe on August, 12, 2009.
Falling Down on the Job
It’s not often that a report appears that identifies a problem and at the same time, another report is released that offers a solution to that problem. But that may be what happened this month with the publication of an article describing the frequency of hip fractures and their complications and another article detailing an intervention that reduced the complication rate after hip fracture.
The first study presents data on hip fractures in the U.S. between 1985 and 2005. Previous data indicated that there are about 350,000 hip fractures every year in the U.S., almost all of them in people over 65 and the vast majority in people over age 75. Half of those who break their hip never return to their baseline level of mobility, 20% die within a year, and 25% of those who lived independently before the fracture require permanent nursing home care afterwards. The new report concludes that hip fracture rates and subsequent mortality among people over 65 are declining. But closer inspection of the data shows a different picture.
What the report really shows, as the authors indicate in the discussion section of their paper, is that there were two distinct time periods worthy of analysis. Between 1986 and 1995, the incidence of fractures increased in both men and women (corrected for age) but between 1995 and 2005, the incidence declined steadily. It declined a lot: among women, the incidence fell 25% and among men it fell 19%. But the mortality story is another matter. Looking at death rates at 1 month, 6 months, and at a year after hip fracture, the study found that between 1986 and 1995, mortality fell, but between 1996 and 2005, there was no improvement in mortality whatsoever.
The decline in the rate of hip fractures is good news, though it’s not entirely clear what caused it. The authors point to lifestyle factors, such as greater intake of vitamin D and calcium, along with increased exercise. They also point out that bisphosphonates, medications used to treat osteoporosis, were introduced at just about the same time that hip fracture rates began to fall, but these drugs can account for at most 40% of the reduction in risk.
The lack of improvement in mortality in the recent 10-year period, however, is troubling. Much of it reflects the fact that older people who fracture a hip are frail—and their frailty predisposes them to other medical problems in the following year. But the second article on hip fractures that appeared in a major medical journal this month offers a ray of hope. Reporting on the impact of co-management of hip fracture patients by orthopedists and geriatricians, investigators from the University of Rochester School of Medicine found enormous improvements in outcomes with their model.
Patients cared for in the “Geriatric Fracture Center” in Rochester were older than their counterparts who received standard orthopedic care (mean age 84.7 vs 81.6), they were more likely to have dementia (53% vs 21.5%), and they were much more likely to come from nursing homes and assisted living facilities (60.6% vs 12.2%). Despite all these differences, the co-managed patients fared far better. They went to the operating room much more quickly (in an average of 24.1 hours vs 37.4 hours), which has been shown to lead to better results. They stayed in the hospital less long (4.6 days on average vs 8.3 days) and they had fewer complications (30.6% vs 46.3%). In particular, they were less likely to develop delirium (acute confusion), infection, and blood clots, all of which predispose to early death.
The finding that “co-managed” patients did better than those cared for exclusively by orthopedists does not necessarily translate into improved survival rates. Some of the long-term mortality is unrelated to the hip fracture and simply reflects the reality that people who break a hip tend to be old and sick and that people who are old and sick die. But the component of the mortality from hip fractures that is amenable to intervention probably involves the post-operative management of patients. It is precisely those nasty complications of surgery that, over time, cause death. Finding a way to take care of individuals with hip fractures that decreases their risk of complications is an excellent strategy for preventing death.
Is the “Comanaged Geriatric Fracture Center” really the answer? It may be. The Rochester study was a retrospective cohort analysis, so it is possible that the findings reflect undetected differences between the patients or other differences in the institutions where care was provided. A randomized trial, in which some patients receive one form of care and others, chosen randomly, get the other type of care, would demonstrate decisively whether and how much co-management helps. But joint care by orthopedists and geriatricians is in widespread use in other countries such as Australia and New Zealand, with good results. And similar but less potent strategies have been used in the U.S., such as the use of geriatric consultation for patients on the orthopedic service. When this multidisciplinary approach was instituted at Oregon Health Sciences University and at the Johns Hopkins Bayview Medical Center, fewer complications, decreased length of stay, and earlier surgery were all observed. These systematic ways to assure improved care for older people with hip fractures can be instituted now. There’s pretty compelling evidence that they work and cost calculations suggest they save money, too. If we don’t start introducing this model into practice, we’re falling down on the job.
The first study presents data on hip fractures in the U.S. between 1985 and 2005. Previous data indicated that there are about 350,000 hip fractures every year in the U.S., almost all of them in people over 65 and the vast majority in people over age 75. Half of those who break their hip never return to their baseline level of mobility, 20% die within a year, and 25% of those who lived independently before the fracture require permanent nursing home care afterwards. The new report concludes that hip fracture rates and subsequent mortality among people over 65 are declining. But closer inspection of the data shows a different picture.
What the report really shows, as the authors indicate in the discussion section of their paper, is that there were two distinct time periods worthy of analysis. Between 1986 and 1995, the incidence of fractures increased in both men and women (corrected for age) but between 1995 and 2005, the incidence declined steadily. It declined a lot: among women, the incidence fell 25% and among men it fell 19%. But the mortality story is another matter. Looking at death rates at 1 month, 6 months, and at a year after hip fracture, the study found that between 1986 and 1995, mortality fell, but between 1996 and 2005, there was no improvement in mortality whatsoever.
The decline in the rate of hip fractures is good news, though it’s not entirely clear what caused it. The authors point to lifestyle factors, such as greater intake of vitamin D and calcium, along with increased exercise. They also point out that bisphosphonates, medications used to treat osteoporosis, were introduced at just about the same time that hip fracture rates began to fall, but these drugs can account for at most 40% of the reduction in risk.
The lack of improvement in mortality in the recent 10-year period, however, is troubling. Much of it reflects the fact that older people who fracture a hip are frail—and their frailty predisposes them to other medical problems in the following year. But the second article on hip fractures that appeared in a major medical journal this month offers a ray of hope. Reporting on the impact of co-management of hip fracture patients by orthopedists and geriatricians, investigators from the University of Rochester School of Medicine found enormous improvements in outcomes with their model.
Patients cared for in the “Geriatric Fracture Center” in Rochester were older than their counterparts who received standard orthopedic care (mean age 84.7 vs 81.6), they were more likely to have dementia (53% vs 21.5%), and they were much more likely to come from nursing homes and assisted living facilities (60.6% vs 12.2%). Despite all these differences, the co-managed patients fared far better. They went to the operating room much more quickly (in an average of 24.1 hours vs 37.4 hours), which has been shown to lead to better results. They stayed in the hospital less long (4.6 days on average vs 8.3 days) and they had fewer complications (30.6% vs 46.3%). In particular, they were less likely to develop delirium (acute confusion), infection, and blood clots, all of which predispose to early death.
The finding that “co-managed” patients did better than those cared for exclusively by orthopedists does not necessarily translate into improved survival rates. Some of the long-term mortality is unrelated to the hip fracture and simply reflects the reality that people who break a hip tend to be old and sick and that people who are old and sick die. But the component of the mortality from hip fractures that is amenable to intervention probably involves the post-operative management of patients. It is precisely those nasty complications of surgery that, over time, cause death. Finding a way to take care of individuals with hip fractures that decreases their risk of complications is an excellent strategy for preventing death.
Is the “Comanaged Geriatric Fracture Center” really the answer? It may be. The Rochester study was a retrospective cohort analysis, so it is possible that the findings reflect undetected differences between the patients or other differences in the institutions where care was provided. A randomized trial, in which some patients receive one form of care and others, chosen randomly, get the other type of care, would demonstrate decisively whether and how much co-management helps. But joint care by orthopedists and geriatricians is in widespread use in other countries such as Australia and New Zealand, with good results. And similar but less potent strategies have been used in the U.S., such as the use of geriatric consultation for patients on the orthopedic service. When this multidisciplinary approach was instituted at Oregon Health Sciences University and at the Johns Hopkins Bayview Medical Center, fewer complications, decreased length of stay, and earlier surgery were all observed. These systematic ways to assure improved care for older people with hip fractures can be instituted now. There’s pretty compelling evidence that they work and cost calculations suggest they save money, too. If we don’t start introducing this model into practice, we’re falling down on the job.
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